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ABSTRACT
Social tipping, where minorities trigger larger populations to engage in collective action, has been suggested as one key aspect
in addressing contemporary global challenges. Here, we refine Granovetter’s widely acknowledged theoretical threshold model
of collective behavior as a numerical modelling tool for understanding social tipping processes and resolve issues that so far
have hindered such applications. Based on real-world observations and social movement theory, we group the population
into certain or potential actors, such that – in contrast to its original formulation – the model predicts non-trivial final shares of
acting individuals. Then, we use a network cascade model to explain and analytically derive that previously hypothesized broad
threshold distributions emerge if individuals become active via social interaction. Thus, through intuitive parameters and low
dimensionality our refined model is adaptable to explain the likelihood of engaging in collective behavior where social tipping
like processes emerge as saddle-node bifurcations and hysteresis.
Introduction
Studies of collective behavior or action, such as protest demonstrations, responses to disasters or even revolution1, fosters an
understanding of the formation and logic of the crowd2–5. Broadly, the study of collective behavior can be separated into either
those of social movements or temporary gatherings. Social movements are usually more structured around specific, identified
goals, have deeper social connections between actors, are organized (generally to defend or fight against existing authorities)
and persist over time (such as the civil rights movements)6. In contrast, gatherings (such as riots, sudden protests, concerts,
sporting events) are more spontaneous, less organized, do not carry as deep of social connections between actors, and can be
quite ephemeral7, 8.
Further, individual engagement in collective behaviors (such as changing consumption behavior or adoption of new
technologies) can be connected to broader social processes, such as norms and expectations for behavior9. Specifically,
individuals strategically control their actions in accordance with their norms in order to achieve their goals and objectives4, 5, 10.
As such, norms and preferences structure an actor’s likelihood to engage in collective behaviors, as well as its form of
participation within these groups. Complex forms of collective behaviors (be it either a movement or a crowd) are thus created
through dynamic interactions of actors that share common goals and objectives for a given social situation. For example, global
climate change has been frequently noted as one prominent contemporary social problem that could trigger and might also be
addressed through collective behaviour (such as the emergent ‘Fridays for Future’11 movement)12, 13.
Empirical evidence for such complex contagion of interlinked individuals that leads to collective action has been provided
for both online14–16 and offline17 social networks. Additionally, complex contagion has been experimentally shown to foster
social tipping18, a process that has gained increased attention in the recent past19 due to its potential for rapid societal changes
with profound impacts on the entire socio-ecological Earth System13, 20. Complementing empirical studies, recent conceptual
models of complex contagion incorporate the spreading of an action, behaviour or trait through a complex network21–25. They
often aggregate an individual’s surrounding over time26, 27 or abstract space28 to accumulate exposure to a considered trait such
that at a certain point the individual adopts that trait as well. Such models have been applied successfully to study processes
involved in the spreading of opinions29, 30, large-scale epidemics23, the adoption of life-style choices31 or the collective
behaviour of animal groups32, 33. However, most such models of collective behaviour are often tailored to a specific problem
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(both in the incorporated processes as well as the underlying parameter set) and are thus often not transferable to different and
novel applications.
The Granovetter threshold model is a comparatively early contribution to this field, providing a core basis for subsequent
and more contemporary modeling attempts34. This model aims to explain the emergence of collective behaviors while noting
that individual norms and preferences are a crucial factor determining their development and final outcome. In particular,
when presented with a simple binary choice – to participate within a collective behavior or not – each individual has a certain
activation threshold for participation. This measures the proportion of the group that an individual would like to observe
participating within the collective behavior before they are willing to join themselves. The thresholds emerge from the norms,
preferences, goals and beliefs of each individual, e.g., representing a kind of trade-off between the costs and benefits of joining
in the behavior. As such, the application of the threshold model, or variations thereof, is not limited to simple crowd-like
behaviors, such as protests and riots, but is comparatively broad, encompassing collective behaviors e.g., voting35, diffusion of
innovations36, or migration37, as well as classical social movements such as the Monday Demonstrations in East Germany38.
However, while by design the model is very flexible, it has mainly been used for illustrative and theoretical purposes (including
most applications outlined above), but hardly applied as a numerical modeling tool.
This paper identifies two major sets of issues that prevent broader application of the Granovetter model and proposes
extensions to resolve them. First, under often assumed threshold distributions (such as cut-off Gaussians34) the model usually
unrealistically predicts either no-one or the entire population to eventually act. We resolve this issue by drawing from real-world
observations, social movement and resource mobilization theories39, 40, as well as recent theoretical and numerical results
regarding network spreading processes41, 42 to extend the original model by classifying individuals as either certainly active,
certainly inactive, or contingently active. This causes the model to display nontrivial equilibria in which a certain part of
the contingent individuals becomes active. Second, the emergence and shape of the threshold distribution itself is often
underexplained. Therefore, we utilize an established conceptual network cascade model28 and show that a broad (non-Gaussian)
threshold distribution emerges from microscopic networked interactions in which potentially active individuals join an action if
a sufficient number of their neighbors are also engaged. We thus specifically acknowledge empirically observed tendencies
of individuals to make decisions with respect to their immediate social surrounding rather than considering the entire global
population, i.e., the mean field18, 43, 44. By addressing both of the above issues, we effectively separate (unique) individual
preferences which determine general tendencies towards or against an action from the embedding of each individual into a
larger social structure and corresponding exposure to external influences. Both characteristics then co-determine whether the
individual ultimately joins into an action or not.
The remainder of this work is organized as follows. We first introduce the formal specifics of the Granovetter threshold
model and discusses in detail its aforementioned conceptual limitations. We then implement the proposed solutions and present
a refined threshold model that only depends on parameters that are readily observable in real-world systems. Additionally, we
provide an analytical solution of the refined model and analyse its potential for modeling social tipping. Ultimately, we close
with a discussion of the results and an outlook to future work.
Granovetter’s threshold model
The threshold model assigns each individual in a population of size N a threshold that defines the number of others that must
participate in an action before the considered individual does so, too34. In its discrete-time formulation the number of acting
individuals at time t + 1, R(t + 1), is hence directly derived from the cumulative distribution function of thresholds in the
population, F , such that
R(t+1) = NF(R(t)). (1)
Note that the original exemplary application of the model was that of individuals’ participation in riots. Hence the choice of
the variable R for the number of acting individuals. An equilibrium number of acting individuals R∗ is obtained by solving
R(t+1) = R(t) = NF(R(t)) for R(t) which is equivalent to finding an intersection of the graph of F with the diagonal through
(0,0) and (N,N), Fig. 1a. All equilibrium points R∗ at which F intersects the diagonal line from above are stable, while all
others are unstable34.
While the threshold model has been widely used within a broad literature40, 45, 46 it has up to now been mainly used for
illustrative purposes as a number of issues hinder its application as numerical modeling tool:
Plausible distributions typically predict no one or the entire population to act
As thresholds are hard to estimate, one typically assumes Gaussian threshold distributions34 cut off at the extreme values 0 and
N. However, assuming a mean threshold µ of reasonable size and a moderate standard deviation σ implies that there are only
few individuals with low or high thresholds and many with medium thresholds close to µ . Hence, under the typical assumption
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of a low number of instigators34 the model usually predicts zero eventually acting individuals, Fig. 1a. Only if a sufficiently
large σ is chosen more individuals than the instigators become active. However, the choice of a large σ causes the distribution
to become rather flat instead of bell-shaped. For example, for a population size of N = 100 and an average threshold of µ = 25,
a standard deviation of σ = 12.2 is required so that a single instigator can cause the rest of the population to become active34.
In addition, if no individual has a threshold larger than 100%, the threshold model generally has a second typically stable
fixed point at R∗ = N implying that the entire population has the potential to become active if only enough others do so, too,
Fig. 1a. In reality, an individual may never engage an action regardless of how many others have already joined as personal
preferences, norms or attitudes can restrict behaviours9. In its basic setup, the Granovetter model can only account for this by
either assigning the concerned individuals a threshold of 100% or by selecting the population such that only those individuals
that are generally in favour of a certain action are considered34. The first approach, however, implies that everyone would
generally be willing to act if only enough other individuals become active before. The second approach requires updating
the population and, hence, its size, whenever the norms and attitudes of an individual change. What both approaches have
in common is that they imply a constant change of the threshold distribution whenever individuals alter their preferences or
attitudes.
We therefore propose below a framework that refines the threshold model and accounts for the above issues by grouping
individuals according to basic preferences that determine whether they certainly, contingently or never act. This circumvents the
existence of trivial solutions and we show that this approach does not require a constant updating of the threshold distribution
as a response to changing group memberships.
The threshold distribution can not be observed, but emerges from microscopic factors
Broadly, two complementary aspects shape whether an individual engages in an action or not. On one hand there are individual
factors (such as background characteristics, social class, education or occupation47, 48), that determine the acceptance of or
inclination towards an action. On the other hand there are group factors, characteristics resulting from one’s embedding in a
larger social network (such as social position, influence, or peer pressure49). Both traits and processes ultimately co-determine
the macroscopic threshold that is exposed to the observer and we call these thresholds of the original Granovetter model
emergent thresholds from here on. However, quantifying the emergent thresholds on the individual basis is difficult, if not
impossible, to achieve without any prior knowledge or assumptions on the aforementioned microscopic characteristics and
interactions. In addition, even properly justifying a certain shape of the emergent threshold distribution is a difficult task as it
remains unclear to which extent different shapes follow from a certain composition of individual traits.
Notably, in analogy to the concept of emergent thresholds there should still exist on the micro-level a share (or number) of
others that join into an action before an individual does so, too. One commonly accepted definition of such a quantity is that of
a threshold fraction28 that is not assessed with respect to the entire population, but with regard to the relevant social ties of a
considered individual34, 50. The specific importance of one’s egocentric social network for decision making has recently been
shown in empirical studies where individuals generally did not aim for consensus or convergence in the global population, but
rather on the microscopic or group-level18, 43. Additionally, it was observed that individuals tend to coordinate with (at least
subsets of) an entire group rather a single partner44. This renders the use of a per-individual threshold fraction particularly
useful as it determines the share of others within a group that must make a certain decision before the considered individual does
so, too. In our specific case this threshold fraction is considered a fundamental trait of each individual, regardless of whether
their preferences and norms favour or hinder a certain action. As such it disentangles social processes from non-social factors,
such as individual preferences and norms. In contrast to the emergent thresholds, these threshold fractions may not necessarily
be widespread. Rather, they might be assumed to have a narrow distribution or correspond to fixed, intuitive points, e.g. 50%
(majority rule)51. Note that in contrast to the emergent thresholds, that measure absolute numbers in a global population, the
threshold fraction measures the relative number of others in one’s egocentric social network that must make a decision before
a considered individual does so, too. It thereby specifically accounts for heterogeneities in the number of each individual’s
neighbors, i.e., the so-called social network’s degree distribution52.
Below we present a microscopic threshold model based on a previous study of cascading dynamics28 where individual
preferences are assigned to each member of the population that then join into an action based on their threshold fractions
applied to the neighborhood in their social network. We then show that such microscopic processes in fact yield an often
postulated broad (but not normal-shaped) emergent threshold distribution.
Results
Refinement of the Model
We start by addressing the first two issues identified above, namely that for the usually chosen distributions the original model
predicts either no-one or the entire population to become active. As discussed above, one way to circumvent these issues is to
assign certain individuals either a threshold of 0% or ≥100% such that some individuals certainly become active and others
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never become active34. This approach requires a constant updating of the threshold distribution and may be impracticable
for many cases. Recent studies investigated the effects of either such certainly active initiators41 or never active immune
individuals42 on the adoption of certain traits or behaviours via spreading dynamics on social networks. In alignment with
social movement theory39, 40 we combine these two notions and suggest to divide the population of size N into three groups,
namely: A< N certainly acting individuals41, C < N−A contingent individuals and the remaining N−C−A certainly inactive
individuals42. The certainly acting and contingent individuals form the group of P = A+C potentially acting individuals. In
a social movement and resource mobilization context, our three groups can for example be seen as representing adherents,
potential supporters and those in opposition39, 40.
If we have no reason to assume that the threshold distribution is different in the three groups, the original recursive formula
Eq. (1) is then replaced by
R(t+1) = A+C ·F(R(t)). (2)
The equilibria of the thus refined model are again obtained by computing the intersection of the r.h.s. of Eq. (2) with the
diagonal through (0,0) and (N,N), Fig. 1b. It is apparent that if A> 0 and P< N (note again that P = A+C), we get nontrivial
equilibrium numbers of acting individuals R∗ ∈ [A,P]. Conveniently, as A or P (and C) change, the new equilibria can be found
without re-estimating the threshold distribution.
In order to also avoid having to redraw F in Fig. 1b whenever there is a variation in A or C, it is beneficial to rescale the
ordinate to the unit interval, Fig. 1c. This allows us to find the equilibria for all possible combinations of A and P in the same
diagram, by drawing F only once and just adjusting the diagonal to meet the points (A,0) and (P,1).
Our adjusted approach makes the application of the threshold model as an actual modeling framework more practical as it
(i) produces nontrivial fixed points R∗, (ii) requires the threshold distribution to be only estimated once for the entire population
or a representative sample thereof, and (iii) relies on only two intuitive parameters, the size of the certainly (A) and potentially
acting population (P). Recall that A directly relates to an immediate action or behaviour, while P denotes the general acceptance
of or attitude towards that action.
Estimation of the emergent threshold distribution
Having refined the threshold model to properly allow for the computation of non-trivial fixed points, we shift our focus to the
second issue that relates to the threshold distribution itself. It has been established above that the emergent thresholds follow
from microscopic characteristics of each individual as well as its embedding in a social context. Specifically for the latter it
will turn out that the share of others, i.e., the threshold fraction, that must join into an action before a contingent individual
does so too need not be widely distributed or even heterogeneous at all across the population in order to produce a widespread
distribution for the emergent threshold.
We now study how such characteristics and interactions on the micro-level determine one’s emergent threshold by using a
simulation model of social contagion that has been studied in the past to model binary decisions with externalities and resulting
cascading dynamics28. We represent each individual in the population by a node in a complex network and draw links between
nodes to indicate their embedding in a social group of others (see Methods section below for details). This relates directly to the
idea of a sociomatrix that accounts for the stronger influence that individuals to which one forms a social bond have on one’s
behaviour34. In addition to the original formulation of this network cascade model28 and in agreement with the consideration
put forward above we assume that P randomly distributed nodes form the potentially active population. Being potentially active
subsumes all norms, preferences and attitudes that cause an individual to show acceptance for a considered type of behaviour.
Among the P potentially active nodes we assume that A≤ P randomly distributed nodes are certainly active. In each time step
each of the remaining C = P−A contingent nodes i becomes active if more than a share ρ ∈ [0,1] of its immediate neighbors is
already active. We hence denote ρ the threshold fraction of an individual. The resulting number or active nodes at time t is
again denoted as R(t). Setting a common value of ρ represents the most narrow distribution of actual threshold fractions that
determine whether one joins into action given that one generally supports that action at all.
We simulate cascades of nodes becoming active for two different shares of potentially active nodes p = P/N = 0.56
(Fig. 2a) and p = 1 (Fig. 2b), as well as for different threshold fractions ρ ∈ {0.2,0.5,0.8}. Fig. 2 shows the final share of
acting nodes r∗ = R∗/N after the cascade stops for increasing shares of certainly acting nodes a = A/N ≤ p. For p = 0.56
(i.e., a low share of potentially acting nodes) only small threshold fractions (ρ = 0.2) allow for a large-scale cascade such that
r∗→ p for values of a' 0.05 (Fig. 2a). In contrast, for values of a/ 0.05 no cascade is observed and, hence, r∗ ≈ a. Larger
threshold fractions (i.e., ρ = 0.5 or ρ = 0.8) hinder the emergence of a cascade such that r∗ ≈ a for all choices of a (Fig. 2a).
For p = 1, cascades are also observed at a larger threshold fraction of ρ = 0.5 but are still suppressed for ρ = 0.8 (Fig. 2b).
Furthermore, the required share of certainly acting nodes a at which the system tips from a state with no cascades to a state
with a global cascade decreases slightly with increasing p (compare Fig. 2a and Fig. 2b). Note that specifically the role of
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the remaining N−P certainly inactive nodes has been studied under the term immune nodes in an earlier study of spreading
dynamics on networks42. However, in contrast to our results presented above the underlying model in this previous work42
assumed the share of certainly active nodes a to increase over time at a constant rate, thus yielding convergence to a globally
stable fixed point r∗ = p for all initial choices of a. Hence, the major purpose of the immune nodes in this earlier work was to
moderate the rate of convergence to that global fixed point.
To estimate an emergent threshold distribution as required for the Granovetter-type threshold model we now plot r(t) =
R(t)/N against (r(t +1)−a)/c (with c =C/N = (P−A)/N) from the network simulations. Fig. 3 shows the results if the
network cascade is close to equilibrium, i.e., for t = 0 or t = tmax−1, where tmax is the time at which the cascade stops. We
observe the formerly postulated broad distribution of emergent thresholds as a result of the microscopic interactions at narrowly
distributed threshold fractions ρ ∈ {0.2,0.5,0.8} given a generally positive (P nodes) or negative (N−P nodes) attitude towards
the considered behaviour. This implies that individuals with a high emergent threshold may not necessarily be more reluctant to
join into an action, it could simply mean that they are located at a more peripheral position in the network.
By approximating the number of active, ai, and inactive neighbors, bi, of a node i as coming from a common multinomial
distribution that only depends on the number of neighbors ki = ai+bi and the overall share of active nodes r(t), we derive an
analytical approximation of the emergent threshold distribution F (note that for brevity we omit the dependence of r(t) on t) as
F(r) = 1− exp(−K)
∞
∑
bi=0
(K−Kr)bi
bi!
⌊
ρbi
1−ρ
⌋
∑
ai=0
(Kr)ai
ai!
. (3)
Here, K = ∑i ki/N denotes the average degree (i.e., number of neighbors) of nodes in the network (see Methods section below
and the Supplementary Information for a full derivation of Eq. (3)). Note that the second factor in Eq. (3) can be further
approximated by an incomplete Gamma-Function. We find that (close to equilibrium) Eq. (3) aligns very well with the network
simulations for small (ρ = 0.2), medium (ρ = 0.5) and large (ρ = 0.8) fractional thresholds (Fig. 3) and thus complements
previously proposed approximations that primarily held for small to medium values41. For the transient phase the approximation
still estimates the emergent thresholds well for small and large choices of ρ but decreases in quality for intermediate values
(see Supplementary Information). This is mainly caused by the clustering of active and inactive nodes. An extension of the
above approximation that accounts for such factors, e.g., via pair approximations53, 54 or moment generating functions28, is
beyond the scope of this work and remains as a subject for future research. In summary, Eq. (3) gives a good estimation of an
emergent macroscopic distribution that fulfills the initially postulated broad shape34 while emerging from a subsumed set of
preferences as well as a single common threshold fraction ρ . In addition, using a single distribution F has the advantage of
being independent of the share of certainly and potentially acting nodes. As such it only needs to be estimated once while
changing preferences (i.e., varying A/a and P/p) are incorporated into shifting the diagonal line that is used to estimate the fixed
points (see again Fig. 1c).
Comprehensive analysis and social tipping
From the approximate emergent threshold distribution F in Eq. (3) we estimate the fixed points r∗ of the refined threshold
model for different choices of a, p (or c = p−a), and ρ by solving (r−a)/c = F(r) (i.e., intersecting the diagonal line with
F). We either identify two stable and one unstable fixed points, or one globally stable fixed point r∗. Fig. 4a shows the value of
the smallest stable fixed point min(r∗). We find a sharp increase in its value for certain values of 0.15/ a/ 0.22 and p' 0.5
hinting at a saddle-node bifurcation. Fig. 4b,c show that saddle-node bifurcation at varying values of a and p, respectively. As
the saddle-node bifurcation, and correspondingly also hysteresis, emerges in both parameters, the model consequently displays
a cusp-bifurcation as well (see black circle in Fig. 4a). For fixed values of a or p below the cusp-point the final share of acting
individuals r∗ thus varies only smoothly with the respective other free parameter (red lines in Fig. 4b,c). In contrast, fixing
either a or p to values above the cusp-point can cause the system to rapidly shift from a stable state with low r∗ to a stable state
with high r∗ (and vice versa) as the corresponding bifurcation point in the remaining free parameter is crossed (black lines in
Fig. 4b,c). Notably, the model shows hysteresis also within a band of possible threshold fractions, Fig. 4d).
In summary, our model conceptually shows what has formerly been termed social tipping, i.e., a process where for a given
population a small change in the size of a dedicated minority can have a large effect18, 20, 55. In our specific case, for a given
value of a or p a small change in the respective other parameter suffices to largely increase (or decrease) the share of finally
acting individuals r∗. Complementing recent theoretical and numerical studies of spreading processes on networks that either
varied the size of the initiating minority41 or the so-called immune group of inactive nodes42 our model shows a bistable regime
that is necessary for the emergence of hysteresis. This implies that once the system has tipped it sustains its state of high (low)
shares of acting individuals r∗ even if a or p were to be reduced (increased) again. By incorporating both, initiating and immune
groups, our model additionally gives rise to a previously undetected cusp-bifurcation as well.
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Remarkably, the critical size of the dedicated minority at which the system undergoes a fold-bifurcation (Fig. 4a,b) has
recently been empirically estimated to lie in the range 0.21 / a / 0.25 which is consistent with the results of our model18.
Moreover, critical minority group sizes of around 20 percent have also been discussed with respect to the Pareto-Principle56
which has recently been reframed as the law of the vital few to discuss matters of sustainability transformations and social
tipping57.
Discussion
We have proposed a refined version of the original Granovetter threshold model34 that addresses a set of issues that, so far, have
hindered its application as a conceptual modeling tool. Specifically, we propose to divide the considered population of size
N into three classes (certainly, potentially, and certainly not acting individuals) of different sizes A ≤ P, P ≤ N, and N−P.
In addition, we propose a threshold distribution that emerges from microscopic interactions between individuals on a social
network. This distribution solely depends on the average connectivity K of individuals and a common threshold fraction ρ to
join into an action given that their individual preferences and attitudes are already favourable with respect to that action. The
four parameters of our refined model are of intuitive nature and allow for a systematic evaluation of its dynamics in terms of a
bifurcation analysis (except for K which only needs to be chosen sufficiently larger than zero, i.e., K 0, see Supplementary
Information for details). As in the original threshold model, an estimation of the fixed points can be obtained by (graphically)
intersecting the diagonal line defined by a and p with the emergent threshold distribution F . The three crucial parameters a, p,
and ρ all cause a saddle-node bifurcation which is a prototypical mechanism behind tipping points in many other systems,
such as in ecology58, 59 or the climate system60, 61, as well. It thus makes the model a promising tool to study the emerging
field of social tipping18, 20, 55 where little things can make a big difference62 and minority groups can trigger large shares of a
population to engage in collective action.
Our revised model describes multiple forms of collective behaviors, including social movements and crowd-like behaviors.
For both such behaviors, norms are directly called upon to structure individual likelihood to engage in actions while also
observing the actions of others around them. Importantly, there are differences in the speed of the process. For crowds the
observation of social members is made relatively quickly, as are the decisions to participate in the actions. In contrast, these
processes can be much slower for social movements. For both cases, however, we identify three time scales that are underlying
our refined threshold model. We assume that the microscopic threshold fractions change at the slowest time scale (usually years
to decades), as these are attributed to the unique identity of an individual (which may be less prone to sudden external shocks).
In contrast, the classification into certainly or contingently active individuals varies on intermediate time scales (months to
years) as changes in the environment (such as financial shocks or the exposition to increasing extreme weather events) are
beyond an individual’s own agency and can trigger sudden changes in attitudes63. The social dynamics modelled here, i.e., the
observation of others and the joining into an action, are happening on the fastest time scale (days to months) as frequent social
interactions are common among members of any given society.
Most parameters of the refined model may be readily measurable in a variety of applications. Attitudes that determine p
could be estimated from surveys or existing panel data. The share of certainly acting individuals a could be given by those in
the population that inevitably need to act, e.g., migrate as a consequence of climate change impacts64, 65. For the average degree
K it may often suffice to set it to a reasonable number, e.g., Dunbar’s Number that suggests a cognitive limit to the number of
people with whom an individual can maintain a persistent social relationship66 (see Supplementary Information for details).
The threshold fraction ρ could then either remain as a free parameter of the model or be set to fixed intuitive points such as
50% (majority rule) or 20% (Pareto principle56, 57). Furthermore, the model also allows for changes in its parameters over time,
such that r∗ can be estimated as a time-dependent variable, possibly causing the system to tip back and forth between its two
possible stable states. In that sense the respective parameters can be incorporated into the system’s internal dynamics as slowly
changing variables.
Future work should concentrate on collecting data for the different parameters and then consequently test and calibrate the
model against historical test cases. One specific challenge that lies within such an endeavor is the estimation of appropriate
(relative) time scales at which the parameters and the internal variables change. In addition, appropriate early-warning
indicators61, 67, 68 should be applied to study the existence of precursory signals for the transgression of a social tipping point,
i.e., bifurcation, in our model. Some of these indicators would require a further extension of the model such that individuals
may also spontaneously become active with a low probability even if their threshold fraction is not transgressed (or vice versa).
We further acknowledge that up to now a proposal for an emergent threshold distribution has only been derived analytically for
the case of an Erdo˝s-Rényi random network69. While this lays good groundwork, the threshold distribution should also be
explored for topologies (such as scale-free70 and small-world networks71) that more closely mimic those of real-world social
systems. Hence, even though our proposed approximation of the emergent threshold distribution holds well if the system is
well-mixed and close to a fixed point, more elaborate methods, e.g., pair approximations54 and moment generating function
approaches28, should be used to predict the model’s dynamics for more general network topologies and during transient phases
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as well. Ultimately, the model should be applied as a conceptual modeling tool, e.g., to make qualitative statements on the
possibility for social tipping with respect to issues of global change or sustainability transformations12, 72, 73 under different
scenarios.
Methods
Network cascade model
For the microscopic network simulation we consider an Erdo˝s-Rényi random network69 with N = 100000 nodes and a
linking probability of `= 9 ·10−5 resulting in an average degree of K = 10. We vary the number of certainly acting nodes A
logarithmically between 1 and N and the number of potentially acting nodes logarithmically between A and N. For each setting
of A and P (and fixed values of the threshold fraction ρ as given in Fig. 2) we create an ensemble of n = 100 networks and
randomly assign P out of the N nodes as potentially active. Out of those P nodes we then randomly assign A certainly acting
nodes. The model then runs in discrete time steps t. In each time step, every potentially active, yet inactive, node i becomes
active if its share of active neighbors exceeds the threshold fraction ρ . All nodes update their status synchronously at each time
step. The simulation stops if the number of newly activated nodes at time t equals zero, i.e., if R(t−1) = R(t). Note that our
model is based on previous works that implemented a simpler version of a cascade model that did not account for a distinction
in potentially active and certainly inactive nodes28.
Approximation of the emergent threshold distribution
The approximate emergent threshold distribution F in Eq. (3) is derived by assuming that for each individual i the number of
active ai and inactive neighbors bi are distributed according to a common multinomial distribution, giving
F(R) = ∑
ai>ρ(ai+bi)
ai≤R
bi≥0
bi≤P′
(
R
ai
)(
P′
bi
)
`ai`bi(1− `)R−ai(1− `)P′−bi . (4)
P′ = N−1−R denotes the number of inactive individuals that are not the considered i, as one’s own level of activity is not
accounted for. ` is the linking probability of the Erdo˝s-Rényi network. Eq. (3) follows from Eq. (4) by setting R = brNc,
substituting the binomial distributions by two Poisson distributions with expectation values λa = Kr and λb = K−Kr and
assuming that N K. A step-by-step derivation of Eq. (3) is given in the Supplementary Information.
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Figure 1. Extension of Granovetter’s (graphic) model with P potentially and A certainly acting individuals. (a) The original
model that computes the number of acting individuals R(t+1) from the cumulative distribution function of thresholds F . The
purple line indicates a typical normal-like choice for this distribution. The 45◦-line (green) intersects F at the stable (black) and
unstable (white) equilibrium points R∗. As for many realistic choices of F , only R∗ = 0 and R∗ = N are stable. (b) Introducing
A certainly and P potentially acting individuals, such that the C = P−A contingent individuals have the same threshold
distribution F as the entire population N. Here, the equilibria move to the interval R∗ ∈ [A,P] and are not necessarily located at
exactly R∗ = A and R∗ = P. Hence, the A certainly acting individuals trigger some contingent individuals to act, too. (c)
Rescaling R(t+1) to the unit interval shows that equilibria can be computed by shifting the diagonal line from crossing (0,0)
and (N,N) (as in (a)) to crossing (A,0) and (P,1) and using the same threshold distribution F as in (a).
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Figure 2. The final share of acting nodes r∗ in the microscopic network simulation for given shares of certainly acting nodes a.
(a) With only around half the population being potentially active (i.e, p = P/N ≈ 0.56) only a low threshold fraction (ρ = 0.2,
purple) causes large shares of the contingent nodes to act. Grey areas indicate values of r∗ and a that would exceed p. (b) If
every node in the network is potentially active (p = 1), also an intermediate threshold fraction (ρ = 0.5, green) suffices to cause
the entire population to act. In comparison with (a) one also observes that the transition observed for ρ = 0.2 occurs already for
smaller choices of a. For a large threshold fraction (ρ = 0.8, yellow) no abrupt transition appears such that r∗ ≈ a for all
considered choices of a and p.
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Figure 3. Emergent threshold distribution measured from the microscopic network simulations and the analytical
approximation. For the network simulations only those points where the system is close to equilibrium, i.e. t ∈ {0, tmax−1},
are shown. For all shown choices of threshold fractions ρ , the approximation matches well with the network simulations.
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Figure 4. Bifurcation analysis and hysteresis of the refined Granovetter model with an emergent threshold distribution as
given by the analytical approximation. (a) Smallest stable fixed point min(r∗) for different shares of certainly acting a and
potentially acting individuals p. The black circle denotes a cusp-bifurcation. Black dashed horizontal/vertical lines correspond
to the diagrams in (b)/(c) that show a saddle-node bifurcation. For (b),(c) and (d), solid (dotted) lines indicate stable (unstable)
fixed points r∗. Grey shading indicates those areas where r∗ /∈ [a, p] and that can thus not be reached. The yellow circled area
in (a) indicates the bistable regime. Red lines in (a) correspond to values of p and a at which no bifurcation is observed and
thus r∗ varies smoothly in (b)/(c). (d) shows the bifurcation diagram in the threshold fraction ρ . Fixed parameters are: a = 0.16
for (c) (a = 0.24 for the red line) and (d), p = 0.67 for (b) (p = 0.58 for the red line) and (d), and ρ = 0.4 for (a), (b) and (c).
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